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I. Background
The vast majority of Somalis who have remained in their country con-
tinue to rely on remittance money sent from abroad. Although smaller 
waves of immigration have occurred for many years,1 prolonged 
political and economic turmoil coupled with periods of violence and 
humanitarian crisis have caused the number of Somali immigrants to 
spike in the last twenty years. This population outflow has resulted 
in an extensive diaspora network across the globe, with communities 
established across the Greater Horn of Africa, the Gulf States, North 
America, and Europe. Estimates on the size of the Somali diaspora 
range from 1–1.5 million people globally,2 or approximately 14 percent 
of Somalia’s total population.
These diaspora communities have traditionally remained actively 
engaged on Somali political and economic developments from their 
adopted countries. One of the diaspora’s primary ties to the homeland 
comes in the form of remittances—money that is sent on a regular 
basis to family and friends in Somalia. These funds have often been 
called a lifeline for the Somali people, covering the costs of needs such 
as food, education, and health care.3 Although the exact scale of remit-
tance flows is difficult to pinpoint, estimates have ranged from $750 
million to $1.6 billion annually and these funds account for nearly 60 
percent of the Somali recipients’ average annual incomes.4
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Remittance transactions are processed by money service businesses 
(MSBs), also known as hawalas, which provide access to financial ser-
vices across Somalia in places where formal banking systems do not 
exist. International financial institutions provide “holding accounts” 
for MSBs to deposit funds from senders before they are wired to the 
payout locations where they will reach recipients. Due to the rapid 
turnover in MSB bank accounts and the varying customer due dili-
gence (CDD) standards in the jurisdictions that receive the transferred 
funds, MSBs have come under increased global scrutiny in recent years 
and been identified as an area of vulnerability for criminal use, includ-
ing terrorist financing. In response to tightened anti-money laundering 
and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations and 
the imposition of high penalties for noncompliance, there has been a 
rising trend among financial institutions to exit relationships with cli-
ents deemed “high risk”—including many of the Somali MSBs.
Somalis are not the only remitting community confronted with this 
problem, but de-risking has proven to be particularly pervasive for 
the Somali community in terms of both targeting and impact. In 2001 
the U.S. government shut down the operations of al-Barakaat—which, 
before the attacks of September 11, was the largest MSB serving Soma-
lis—because of suspicions that it had been used as a channel to funnel 
money to al-Qaida. Despite the 9/11 Commission’s finding that hawalas
including al-Barakaat were not used to fund the 9/11 operation itself,5
some unrelated incidents in which individuals of Somali origin were 
found to have funneled money for terrorist purposes through MSBs 
received significant media attention.6 Financial institutions are thus 
increasingly wary of engaging with MSBs, and in recent years a num-
ber of banks, including Sunrise Community Bank, Barclays Bank, and 
Westpac Bank, have begun closing remittance accounts.
Beyond providing vital sustenance funding to relatives in Somalia, 
many diaspora members see remittances as part of their social obliga-
tion and a way to contribute toward financial stability and the rebuild-
ing of their communities despite the geographical distance.7 While 
other diaspora populations must also scramble to identify new finan-
cial institutions following account closures, humanitarian concerns 
and the absence of a financial infrastructure compound the urgency of 
the problem for the many people in Somalia who are largely reliant on 
remittance funds. Due in part to the negative media attention resulting 
from the terrorism financing cases involving hawalas that serve the 
Somali community, many in the Somali diaspora perceive the discrim-
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ination by financial institutions against them to be greater than that 
faced by other diaspora communities.
With these vital funds at risk, it has become increasingly important 
to understand specific remittance corridors and sending practices in 
order to design appropriate policy that encourages financial inclu-
sion and economic integration, and provides incentives for banks to 
maintain these crucial relationships.8 Although the United Kingdom 
remains the primary European destination for Somali immigration, 
Denmark has seen a spike in the number of Somali refugees seeking 
asylum in recent years—rising from just 66 applications lodged in 2009 
to 769 in 2013.9 Denmark’s current Somali diaspora population, which 
includes both well-established members and recent arrivals, is esti-
mated at 19,508.10 A large percentage of the diaspora send remittances 
to Somalia, with Oxfam America estimating that in 2007, $45 million 
was sent annually from nearly 13,000 senders in Denmark.11
While there is much literature and news coverage available on 
Somali remittance linkages to other diaspora communities across 
North America and Western Europe, the body of literature available 
on challenges and opportunities for the Danish-Somali remittance cor-
ridor is comparatively small.12 With a large portion of the Somali dias-
pora in Denmark sending remittances and increasing global scrutiny 
on AML/CFT practices, the regulatory climate for MSBs in Denmark 
has become an important component of Somali diaspora relations. In 
July 2014, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA), known 
as the Finanstilsynet,13 released a statement that Dahab Shiil Money 
Transfer Service Ltd.’s operations within Denmark have not been in 
full compliance with Danish AML legislation following an inspection 
and investigation that began in July 2013. The FSA has since ordered 
the company to establish procedures for the reporting of suspicious 
customer activity in line with Danish AML legislation and to “cease to 
have agents” outside its main office in Copenhagen.14 With inquiries 
into Dahab Shiil’s operational compliance ongoing, it is likely that 
investigations will also spread to other Somali MSBs operating in Den-
mark. In the absence of a clear delineation and mutual understanding 
of roles and responsibilities between regulators and MSB operators, 
the experiences of account closures in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia run the risk of being repeated in Denmark.
This policy brief examines Somali remittance practices in Denmark 
and the operations of Somali MSBs. Additionally, it offers insights into 
Somali perceptions of diaspora relations in Denmark in order to better 
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understand the underlying socio-political considerations related to the 
existing regulatory climate for MSBs. Research for this policy brief was 
conducted through a desk review of the English language literature 
on the topic as well as selected translations in Danish and Somali, 
and field interviews with government actors, private sector representa-
tives, and community leaders in three Danish cities: Aalborg, Aarhus, 
and Copenhagen. The brief
1.  Provides contextual background of the remittance climate and 
Somali diaspora relations in Denmark,
2.  Discusses general trends in MSB operations in Denmark, as well as 
perceptions of those operations, and
3.  Concludes with recommendations for key actors related to regula-
tion.
II. MSB Operations in Denmark
Danish regulations for MSBs are aimed at allowing the safe passage of 
remittances while also countering money laundering/terrorism financ-
ing threats. The FSA of Denmark is the entity responsible for “super-
vising compliance with financial legislation by financial undertakings 
(enterprises).” According to the Danish Financial Business Act, it has 
the authority to issue licenses15 to such institutions within Denmark. 
Within the FSA there is a specific “governance, anti-money laundering 
and payment services” division16 to handle the operations of MSBs 
operating under Danish jurisdiction.
The FSA provides a comprehensive public listing of the enterprises 
under its supervision. To be licensed by the FSA as an independent 
and stand-alone hawala within Denmark, MSBs are listed as “payment 
services area” institutions “with restricted authorization.”17 The list 
currently includes four Somali MSBs: Amal Express Financial Service, 
Dahab Shiil Money Transfer Service ApS, Iftin Express, and the Somali 
Welfare Association. According to one interviewee, another company 
has submitted an application for a license and will receive one pending 
final approval from the FSA. Many of these companies were only regis-
tered in recent years, between June 2010 and July 2012.18 The “restricted 
authorization” permits these businesses receive are in accordance with 
the Payment Services and Electronic Money Act, which lists money 
remittances as payment services in Annex 1, subsection 6.19 Section 
38, subsection 2 of the law pertains to MSBs, qualifying them to be 
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licensed as long as the “preceding 12 months’ average total amount of 
(their) payment transactions . . . (does not) exceed EUR 3 million per 
month.”20 Section 38, subsection 2 of the Payment Services and Elec-
tronic Money Act also covers the operations of agents of MSBs, with 
the line: “any agent for which the undertaking assumes full liability.”21
In Denmark, Somali MSB agents operate in two ways. Somali com-
munities in Danish cities are small22 compared to the communities in 
London,23 Minneapolis,24 and Toronto.25 Because of this, many of the 
registered MSBs in Denmark may only have one main office, which 
is often in Copenhagen. To serve customers in other areas where the 
Somali diaspora is present, such as Aarhus, Aalborg, Kolding, and 
Odense, they contract agents in each of these cities to serve as repre-
sentatives and employees of their MSB. These agents gain access to 
the Danish MSB branch’s bank account so they can transfer the money 
from their location to the main office in Copenhagen. From there, the 
funds leave Denmark for their intended recipients in Somalia or other 
locations in the Greater Horn of Africa.
These agents also operate as employees of MSBs that are not inde-
pendently licensed in Denmark. These MSBs do not have official 
branches in Denmark, but are instead affiliated with more recogniz-
able and well-known MSBs—often not Somali-specific in affiliation—
that serve as their parent companies, including Euronet Payment 
Services, MoneyGram, Western Union, and Xpress Money Services 
Limited. According to the Danish FSA’s website, there are 666 of these 
registered MSB “agents” in Denmark listed under the “payment ser-
vices area.”26 This number is inclusive of all MSBs rather than those 
that serve the Somali community alone. The companies with which 
they are affiliated are obligated to comply with the Danish AML Act as 
per their licensing, and are thus responsible for ensuring the AML/CFT 
compliance of their agents.27
III. Selected Perceptions from MSB Operators
During field interviews, the research team spoke with a limited but 
diverse selection of community members and Somali MSB operators in 
Aalborg, Aarhus, and Copenhagen about their perceptions of the MSB 
industry in Denmark and their experience operating in the Danish reg-
ulatory environment. Individual remittance transactions often average 
between $100 and $300. Breakdowns of the final destinations for remit-
tance funds varied by MSB, but one representative estimated that 80 
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percent of remittances sent through their MSB in Denmark were going 
to Somalia, with the remaining 20 percent going to Somali communi-
ties in East African countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. 
All of those interviewed emphatically stressed the importance of com-
pliance with Danish AML legislation in order to keep their licenses 
or to maintain their agent status under other businesses, though they 
described their view of the law as being “very strict.”28
Adequate compliance with this relatively new legislation involves 
increased operating costs and a substantial time commitment, requir-
ing MSBs to keep extensive records, conduct regular audits, and pro-
vide ongoing AML/CFT training for staff. In highlighting the change in 
MSB prospects since the updates to the Danish AML law, one former 
MSB operator joked that in order to own an MSB branch and stay 
abreast of all of the regulatory requirements, one needs an advanced 
banking degree.29 In addition to being licensed by Denmark, many 
MSBs also must be licensed by their business’ headquarters, which 
involves its own set of compliance and training requirements. While 
interviewees acknowledged the value of the principles they learned 
at these trainings, these dual requirements force MSBs to dedicate 
significant resources to training programs for their Denmark-based 
employees. Oftentimes, a company’s compliance officer will travel 
from headquarters to all of the jurisdictions in which the MSB operates 
to provide in-depth trainings on CDD and reporting guidelines and 
requirements, limiting the compliance officer’s desk time in the com-
pany’s home office.30
MSB representatives also indicated that the record-keeping require-
ments are a time-consuming process that is difficult to conduct with 
limited staff capacities. Some MSB operators struggled with the 
amount of information they are required to aggregate, retain, and then 
provide to regulators for each transaction by customers who “they 
know” and “who know them.” There remained a view among some 
that their primary responsibility in terms of compliance is to collect 
relevant identification information from customers and share this with 
regulatory authorities, rather than proactively monitor for suspicious 
activity or ask too many questions about the source of funds.31
Interviewees generally noted a shift in the viability of hawalas as a 
long-term source of revenue for owners. Representatives of several 
companies indicated that the cost of compliance is making it more 
expensive to process and send remittances, lowering their profits on 
each transaction and often resulting in their barely breaking even. The 
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MSB owners who were interviewed for this research noted that hawala
organizations should not be conceived of as small for-profit businesses 
but, rather, as the embodiment of the obligation of Somali diaspora 
communities across the world to their homeland. Even though one 
representative emphasized that some hawala operators are looking to 
exit the Danish market, he noted that other individuals within the 
community would step up to fill that absence due to this sense of 
responsibility. This duty is also honored equally by the Danish sending 
community; according to one interviewee, even when senders in Den-
mark have no available money, they borrow or apply for a personal 
loan in order to send their monthly remittance payments to Soma-
lia. The significance of this practice as a cornerstone of Somali social 
responsibility is important to consider when discussing the regulatory 
structures for MSBs. Hawala owners in particular may view increased 
AML/CFT scrutiny as suspicion directed at the Somali community, 
rather than a practice applied to all MSBs operating around the world.
Despite the current prevalence of remittances, many interviewees 
expressed concern that a form of remittance decay32—a decreasing vol-
ume of funds sent by Somalis in Denmark to Somalia—is on the hori-
zon for the community as the Danish-born Somali generation reaches 
employment age.33 Many second generation Somalis have never vis-
ited their homeland and no longer have nuclear family members liv-
ing in that country. They feel less connected to their homeland and 
identify more with Danish society—a factor that could reduce their 
willingness to send remittances in the future. Additionally, interview-
ees suggested that the second generation has come to view remit-
tances as a negative practice, creating a culture of dependency that is 
not beneficial to rebuilding Somalia. According to some interviewees, 
many of the younger generation have indicated a preference to sup-
porting development and investment opportunities as opposed to the 
traditional person-to-person remittance structures. Examples include 
remittances for school fees, business development, and as rewards for 
educational achievement. The shift in the purpose of remittances also 
has had an impact on sending practices, with senders moving away 
from small, regular contributions to more infrequent and larger con-
tributions. As the Danish community seeks to regulate the industry, 
transaction amounts and frequency become important variables, as 
these transactions are currently viewed as “irregular” and may be oth-
erwise flagged as suspicious.34
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In terms of sending trends and patterns, MSB operators explained 
that every three months they observe an influx of remittance traffic 
coinciding with the schedule of Danish welfare and child support 
payments. MSBs and community leaders also raised the common 
occurrence of hagbad-type scenarios, in which groups—often led by 
women—collect funds to serve as a pooled savings account in which 
available funds are rotated among participating individuals. Inter-
viewees noted that welfare associations such as the Somali Welfare 
Association collect money from diaspora members and send one lump 
sum payment to Somalia to save on transaction costs.35 These examples 
complement the trend of diaspora members in Denmark choosing to 
finance more expensive endeavors rather than smaller-scale remittance 
payments to individuals.
IV. Diaspora Relations: A Somali Perspective
Denmark is considered an attractive and welcoming place for immi-
grants, offering a generous and supportive social welfare system with 
high levels of public provision for health care, education, and unem-
ployment benefits that are accessible to all citizens and residents. In 
2014, Denmark spent 30 percent of its annual GDP on social expen-
ditures, well above the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) average of 21 percent.36 Somali refugees in par-
ticular remain, however, one of the least integrated minority groups in 
Denmark. For example, in 2010 only 34 percent of men and 22 percent 
of Somali women were employed, due in large part to limited educa-
tion and language difficulties.37
As an increasing number of Somalis settle in Denmark and a second 
generation is born and raised there, more attention has been paid to 
the relationship between the Danish government and the Somali dias-
pora. Denmark is a small country with a relatively homogeneous pop-
ulation and a strong national identity,38 and the recent rise in Somali 
immigration has led to growing concern about its impact as well as the 
challenges of refugee integration. This concern has manifested itself 
in the tightening of asylum legislation, which has been perceived by 
some as a method of preserving “Danish culture.”39 These shifting 
cultural perceptions may have an impact on the ongoing develop-
ment of Somali diaspora relations in Denmark, and here the research 
team provides a brief snapshot of some of the key issues that surfaced 
during interviews with 15 diaspora members. While these cannot be 
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taken as representative of the entire Somali experience in Denmark, 
they provide some insight into the underlying socio-political elements 
of diaspora relations that offer a useful context in which to frame the 
AML/CFT policymaking and regulatory frameworks.
The Danish government has strict requirements for citizenship, 
which many Somalis interviewed see as a strategy to preserve the 
homogeneity of Danish society. In order to become a citizen, one must 
have a permanent residency permit, proof of residency for nine years, 
and cannot have received public assistance under the Active Social 
Policy Act or the Integration Act within the last year or for more than 
30 months in the past five years. Applicants also cannot have any 
outstanding public debt or have been sentenced to prison terms of 18 
months or for more than 60 days for a violation of Penal Code chap-
ters 12 and 13, which are related to terrorism.40 The requirements that 
were most frequently cited by the Somalis interviewed for this study, 
however, were related to the language and citizenship test require-
ments. The Danish government requires foreign nationals to pass a 
Danish language exam, the Danish Test 2 or its equivalent, as well as 
a citizenship test that emphasizes aspects of daily and active politi-
cal life. Finally, applicants must also sign a declaration of allegiance 
and loyalty to Denmark and Danish society.41 Previously, Denmark 
had required applicants to renounce their prior citizenship, but has 
recently relaxed those requirements for refugees—although renounc-
ing is still encouraged for other non-refugee applications.42
Somali interviewees in Denmark found these requirements to be 
challenging for their community, particularly as those interviewed did 
not perceive inherent benefits in obtaining citizenship given that it 
was not a prerequisite for welfare assistance. The only benefit that 
was noted consistently was the ability to travel more freely and to 
potentially relocate to other countries within the EU, including the 
United Kingdom, which is viewed as a “more Somali friendly commu-
nity.”43 The disconnect between residency and citizenship has argu-
ably contributed to the Somali diaspora’s continued identification as 
Somali over Danish. This identification, coupled with the community’s 
heavy engagement in political and economic affairs in Somalia, has 
also encouraged the development of a perceived divide between the 
Somali diaspora and the Danish citizenry. This divide has been further 
exacerbated by the rise of right-wing political groups in Denmark. 
Some indicated that many Somalis feel that they are not accepted by 
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society, and as a result have been largely excluded from participation 
in both the labor market and in Danish civil and political institutions.44
The Danish government has worked to engage with diaspora orga-
nizations on social and political issues, including providing support 
for diaspora-led relief, rehabilitation, and development projects in 
Somalia. One key example is the establishment of the Danish Refu-
gee Council Diaspora Programme funded by the Danish aid agency 
DANIDA. This fund, established for Somali and Afghan refugees, pro-
vides financial support and offers training programs on the design, 
planning, and implementation of development projects. To date, it has 
supported projects such as midwifery training, the construction of a 
water pipeline, and childhood education initiatives in Somalia, among 
others.45 One Somali interviewee who had participated in the appli-
cation process indicated, however, that even this program was very 
complex and required a high degree of Danish language proficiency as 
well as experience developing programs within the Danish context.46
The research team also noted challenges in identifying credible 
and sustainable diaspora organizations. There is no clear process for 
establishment, and many of these groups are informal organizations 
developed according to Somali clan structures. This lack of structure 
presents challenges for the Danish government’s efforts to engage, as 
the diaspora has yet to establish a clear and unified voice with which 
to advocate for diaspora issues within the country. This difficulty was 
illustrated at the recent High Level Partnership Forum Copenhagen, 
a recent conference organized to maintain momentum in the political 
transition process established through the New Deal Conference in 
2013.47 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark limited event par-
ticipants to 335 people, with only 205 allowed in the same room as the 
President of the Federal Government of Somalia, due to security and 
facilitation concerns. This number is, however, much lower than simi-
lar events held in London and Minneapolis.48 There was also an online 
registration requirement for the conference, which many felt was dis-
criminatory against the Somali diaspora in Denmark, who often have 
low levels of general literacy and/or lack computer access.49 Diaspora 
organization representatives who met with the research team saw these 
events as another example of the Danish government’s unwillingness 
to engage with the community or accept them as positive stakeholders, 
further contributing to feelings of alienation.
In isolated instances, challenges including the difficulties in starting 
a new life in Denmark and the increasingly xenophobic tone of right-
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wing politicians have contributed to members of the Somali diaspora 
community in Denmark leaning toward radical Islamism.50 In May 
2012, two Danish brothers of Somali origin were arrested on suspicions 
of plotting a terrorist attack. Both had been residents of Denmark for 
over fifteen years, yet one was suspected of having undergone training 
at an al-Shabaab camp in Somalia.51 Although the crime was not per-
petrated by Somali nationals, tensions also escalated with the exposure 
of a plot to murder staff of a Danish newspaper that had published 
controversial cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.52
These recent incidents, coupled with the rising fear of returning for-
eign fighters across the European Union, have renewed concerns about 
the vulnerability of the Danish-Somali remittance corridor to terrorist 
financing abuse. As the Danish government develops policy and regu-
latory frameworks to counter these vulnerabilities, it is important that 
it also work to ensure that these measures do not further alienate the 
diaspora community but, rather, are designed to support and foster 
balanced financial inclusion and regulatory goals.
V. Recommendations
Following the FSA investigation’s finding that the compliance mech-
anisms of one licensed MSB in Denmark were inadequate, the oper-
ations of other MSB branches and agents in Denmark will likely be 
subject to increased scrutiny in the near future. Multilateral engage-
ment among government regulators, Somali MSBs, and financial insti-
tutions holding MSB bank accounts to raise sector-wide awareness 
of AML/CFT legislation and expectations, demonstrate MSB priori-
tization of compliance, and improve communication will be a proac-
tive step toward preventing worst-case scenarios such as MSB bank 
account closures or MSB operation freezes. This policy brief provides a 
preliminary list of recommendations for stakeholders in the MSB sys-
tem in Denmark:
Danish governmental AML/CFT regulatory bodies should
•  Translate new Danish AML law and guidance notes into Somali, 
issue official English translations of these documents, and circulate 
these translated versions among MSBs to alleviate the language bar-
rier identified by interviewees.
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•  Conduct an MSB sector assessment to identify trends and favor a 
risk-based approach.
•  Conduct due diligence to identify credible and sustainable diaspora 
organizations and improve communication with these organiza-
tions to demonstrate support and willingness to engage.
•  Develop databases for dual citizenship identification to support 
CDD efforts.
•  Issue guidance targeted at MSBs to aid in Suspicious Transaction 
Report (STR) submission and the implementation of CDD require-
ments (for example, the origins of the funds being remitted).
•  Cooperate with financial institutions holding MSB accounts on how 
to maintain the accounts of their high-risk customers and encourage 
their compliance.
•  Offer clarification on the differences in licensing for agents, employ-
ees, subagents, and main offices and their operations and legality 
within Denmark.
Somali MSBs should
•  Submit STRs from Danish branches and agents to regulators and 
also provide this information to the international headquarters of 
their companies.
•  When submitting STRs to regulators, provide the multiple iterations 
of spellings of customer names or potential aliases, nicknames, or 
abbreviations to assist regulators in conducting CDD.
•  Select a community spokesperson who represents the majority’s 
views and offers a unified voice for the Somali community in inter-
actions with Danish government officials on pressing issues affect-
ing the diaspora.
•  Form a remittance union similar to the UK Somali Money Services 
Association and elect a leadership to represent the community in 
discussions with regulators such as the FSA.
•  Work with trusted interlocutors such as nongovernmental organiza-
tions or community leaders to organize trainings for their branches 
and agents specific to compliance with the Danish AML act.




•  Maintain open lines of communication and conduct advocacy 
efforts with banks in Denmark that hold Somali MSB bank accounts 
to ensure that these financial institutions do not drop the accounts.
•  Strengthen information technology systems for Danish branches 
and agents and hire IT consultants who will maintain current web-
site information—for example, updated lists of agent contact infor-
mation in each of the cities in Denmark—and who will fortify public 
websites and internal IT systems against phishing attempts.
Financial institutions in Denmark holding bank accounts of Somali MSBs 
should
•  Avoid a “derisking” approach and instead conduct thorough risk 
assessments of perceived “high risk customers” to determine what 
actions could be taken to enhance the working relationship with 
these customers instead of dropping their accounts.
•  Improve communication with any identified high-risk customers, 
and if the decision is made to close their bank accounts, provide 
them with enough advance notice to make alternate arrangements.
•  Encourage cooperation and information sharing with the FSA and 
the Danish State Prosecutor’s Office for Serious Economic and Inter-
national Crime (SØIK) in relation to open cases.
•  Identify and emulate the best practices of institutions that have suc-
cessfully maintained relationships with and the bank accounts of 
high-risk customers.
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